Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
6
Sandra Destradi: India's Involvement in Nepal (2005 1986, 2005; Russett/Oneal 2001) would argue that it is in the interest of a democratic country like India to have democracies around it since this reduces the likelihood of war. From a different perspective, which combines the logic of domestic politics with foreign policy behavior in a rational choice framework, Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner (2010) have argued that regional powers have strong incentives to favor similar political systems in neighboring states. Democracies, according to this perspective, favor the democratization of neighboring states because the transboundary public goods generated by democratic neighbors help them maximize the provision of public goods for their own domestic audience.
As a consequence of both these ways of reasoning, we can assume that for a regional power like India the promotion of democracy should constitute an ideal instrument of hegemonic influence for the creation of a more predictable and secure neighborhood. A brief look at India's foreign policy, however, induces us to immediately disconfirm this hypothesis for the Indian case. First, New Delhi's attitude towards democracy in its neighborhood has been mixed: referring to the principle of nonintervention in other countries' internal affairs, India has been overtly supportive of undemocratic regimes, for example, in Myanmar/Burma (Kurlantzick 2007; Mohan 2007: 111-112) , and has displayed a high degree of readiness to compromise on issues of human rights and democratic freedoms, for example, in Sri Lanka in 2009 (Destradi 2009b) . Moreover, India has played a marginal role, if any, in the recent "wave" of democratization processes in the South Asian region. 3 Second, the Indian government has not formulated anything like an official democracy-promotion policy (Wagner 2009: 14) . Third, despite India's involvement in US-driven multilateral initiatives in support of democracy as of 2000, New Delhi's activities at this level have also been limited. This has led some authors to interpret India's multilateral engagement for democracy as an instrumental attempt to improve its relations with the United States and its standing as an emerging great power rather than a move driven by the genuine endorsement of democracy promotion as a policy (Cartwright 2009: 421-425; Wagner 2009: 23) .
A recent episode, however, might lead us to assume that a change in India's approach to democracy promotion has taken place: India played a substantial role in neighboring Nepal's return to democracy in the years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . While officially supporting King Gyanendra's authoritarian regime as long as possible, New Delhi at the same time informally facilitated a dialogue between the democratic parties and Maoist rebels, which, as will be discussed later in more detail, ultimately led to the reinstatement of democracy and the end of the civil war in Nepal. 3 In 2008 the Nepalese monarchy was abolished and replaced by a democratic, secular federal republic; the president of the Maldives was voted out after three decades of autocratic rule; Bhutan became a constitutional monarchy after the introduction of democratic reforms by the king; in Pakistan, a civilian government came back to power; and in Bangladesh free elections took place after two years of rule by a military-backed caretaker government. For an overview of India's influence on these events see Destradi (2009a) . In Afghanistan, India has been promoting a huge program of reconstruction and development cooperation which, however, only influences democratic developments in an indirect way (Wagner 2009: 20-21 This paper therefore aims to assess the extent to which India's involvement in Nepal in the period 2005-2008-the most extensive effort on the part of New Delhi in recent years in terms of support for democracy (Destradi 2009a )-represented a shift in India's approach to democracy promotion from its tradition of nonalignment and noninterference (Mohan 2007: 99; Wagner 2009: 9 ) towards a more activist policy. In other words, this study explores the extent to which the most populous democracy in the world has shown signs of becoming a new actor in the international democracy-promotion "landscape."
To this end, the paper proceeds from the general to the particular by providing, first of all, an explanation of India's traditionally limited propensity to promote democracy abroad.
Against this background, India's role in Nepal's return to democracy is examined in detail, leading to the conclusion that the democracy-promotion measures employed by India constituted a short-term, ad hoc change in policy that was driven by the desire to stabilize the country rather than an intentional long-term shift in strategy.
Explaining India's Limited Propensity to Promote Democracy
India has traditionally been extremely reluctant when it comes to the issue of democracy promotion. To provide a framework for the analysis of India's recent involvement in Nepal's return to democracy, this chapter examines the foundations of India's reluctance to promote democracy by identifying the ideational and goal-oriented premises of Indian foreign policy with regard to democracy promotion. Therefore, firstly, an assessment of the Indian elite's ideational approach to democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool is carried out. Secondly, the main goals in India's regional policy are analyzed with a view to assessing their compatibility with the objective of democracy promotion.
India's Ideational Approach to Democracy Promotion
The Indian elite is extremely proud of India's achievements as the most populous democracy in the world and as one of the most stable democracies among the post-colonial states. 4 As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has put it,
[…] India is proud of its democratic heritage which is rooted in the country's cultural ethos of tolerance, respect for different view points and a ready embrace of diversity.
Mahatma Gandhi led us into a non-violent struggle not only to free India from colonial rule but to also ensure to our people the exercise of their democratic rights. 5 4
On the successful implementation and extraordinary resilience of democracy in India, see, for example, Mitra (1991) or the volumes edited by Kohli (2001) and Ganguly/Diamond/Plattner (2007) . Nepal (2005 Nepal ( -2008 In line with the reference to the anti-colonial struggle, India is often implicitly presented as a role model for developing countries since its achievements as a stable democracy are considered to have constituted the basis for economic development and inclusive growth: "most of all, democracy alone gives the assurance that the developmental aspirations of the poorest citizens of our society will be taken into consideration. This above all, is the unique strength of a democratic system." 6
Moreover, the Indian elite often contrasts the India's achievements as a democratic and secular state with the failure of Pakistan to keep the military and fundamentalist religious forces under control. In this discourse, India is represented as a bulwark of democracy and "civilization" against its "backward" rival. More generally, the spread of Islamism in neighboring South Asian countries reinforces the feeling among the Indian elite that India's democracy is "special" and should constitute a role model for other multireligious and multiethnic countries. 7
The extremely high value attached to democracy by the Indian elite is underpinned by widespread support for democratic values among the broader population, as some surveys have revealed. 8 This would induce us to assume that India has a strong propensity to promote democracy abroad. But this is not the case: the Indian policy-making elite is, in fact, extremely cautious when it comes to the issue of democracy promotion-so cautious that we can talk about a tabooization of this topic. Asked if New Delhi has created anything like a "democracy promotion" policy, one of the Indian government officials interviewed replied with an indignant "No, India will never do that!" 9 Beyond the Ministry of External Affairs, this tabooization also reaches to the academic field. The unwillingness to talk about Indian involvement in democratization across borders has its roots in India's tradition of nonalignment and its emphasis on sovereignty and on noninvolvement in other countries' internal affairs. This tendency has been reinforced by India's more cooperative approach towards neighboring countries in South Asia since the 1990s. While former prime minister Indira
Gandhi did not shy away from following a proactive policy of "military activism" (Cohen 2002: 145) and intervention in the neighborhood in the 1980s, the adoption of the Gujral Doctrine in the 1990s made nonreciprocity and noninterference the leading principles of India's regional policy. 10 Over the past few years, India's policy makers have been trying to promote At first glance, India's multilateral policies related to democracy seem to disconfirm this assessment. In fact, in the context of New Delhi's rapprochement to Washington, India joined several US-driven multilateral initiatives for democracy promotion (Cartwright 2009:418-422) .
In 2000 Initiative. Despite its formal participation in these fora and initiatives, however, India's commitment and activities within them have been limited, leading Cartwright (2009: 421-425) and Wagner (2009: 23) to assume that the driving force behind this "new" readiness to engage in democracy-promotion rhetoric was India's wish to improve its relations with the US and to gain international recognition for its aspirations as an emerging power.
New Delhi's critical attitude towards democracy promotion is related, specifically, to the perceived double standards in the United States' policy on democracy and human rights,
in line with what Carothers (2006) has termed a "backlash against democracy promotion" in many parts of the world. From the Indian perspective, the Bush administration's support for General Musharraf's undemocratic regime in Pakistan, which directly affected India's security interests in South Asia, was anathema (Chellaney 2002; Grover 2002) . As one Indian analyst put it, "Bush can hardly strengthen U.S. global leadership by demanding democracy in enemy states while lubricating friendly dictatorships" (Chellaney 2002) . Or, to cite a more vivid example of this resentment:
And yet we were told that, under American pressure, Musharraf was engaged in combatting fundamentalism. That was, of course, a lie. How can it be true when he is the patron of the jehadis in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Only the US State Department can fool itself to believe that he is engaged in promoting democracy. But, then, the USA has always been partial to dictators. (Menon 2002) Beyond these criticisms, India's own experience of indigenous democratic development has spread the belief among policy makers that "to be successful, democracy must have a strong internal basis and cannot be enforced from abroad" (Mohan 2007: 105) .
To summarize, despite India's pride in its own democratic achievements and the firm belief in democracy that is widespread among the elite and the broader population, New
Delhi has a highly critical attitude towards democracy promotion as it has been pursued, so far, by the "West"-with Western democracy promotion mainly equated, however, with US policies. In combination with India's still deep-rooted tradition of nonalignment and with its more cooperative approach to the neighborhood since the adoption of the Gujral Doctrine, this critical attitude has led to a high degree of reluctance on the part of India to engage in democracy-promotion activities. 16 16 Faust/Wagner (2010: 4) add a global and a domestic factor to explain India's "defensive approach" to democracy promotion: on the one hand, India's fear of losing its position as a representative of the "South"; on the other, the fear of triggering a wave of criticism of India's own democracy.
The Prioritization of Foreign Policy Goals
In the following, India's main goals for the South Asian region will be assessed with a view to determining their compatibility with the goal of democracy promotion. Even though the Indian Ministry of External Affairs does not formulate anything like official programmatic documents explicitly stating New Delhi's foreign policy goals, these can be inferred very well through a qualitative content analysis of "key" speeches held by important representatives of the Indian foreign policy-making establishment. 17 When complemented with an assessment of India's goals by the experts interviewed, the analysis allows for the identification of four major goals on the part of the Indian government for the South Asian region overall. 18
India's primary goal for South Asia as a whole can be considered to be stability or, as it is sometimes stated, having a "peaceful periphery." As Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon put it, "[t]he first area of focus for our foreign policy is naturally our neighbourhood, for unless we have a peaceful and prosperous periphery we will not be able to focus on our primary tasks of socio-economic development." 19 Or, as Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran stated, "
[f]or our own sustained economic development and the welfare of our people we need a peaceful and tranquil periphery." 20 That is, the need for stability is closely related to India's own interest in not being unsettled by crises taking place in the neighborhood. The principle of stability was of particular importance in the case of Nepal, as will be discussed later.
The second major foreign policy goal pursued by New Delhi in the region is closely related to stability: avoiding negative security externalities for India. More concretely, these are constituted by terrorism and by the activities of insurgent groups-that is, by all kinds of anti-India activities carried out from the territories of neighboring states and capable of activating destabilizing forces inside India. 21 In the case of Nepal, New Delhi feared a spread of 17
On the selection of "key" texts in discourse analysis, see Neumann (2008) .
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The following speeches, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/, were selected as "key" texts: Ministry of External Ibid. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it, "[i]nternal security is today a larger concern for us than direct external threats. In fact, the most virulent manifestation of the major external threat that we face is in its internal forms, as we saw in Mumbai in July." Reference was made, in this case, to the problem of terrorism.
Government of India, Prime Minister, Extracts of PM's address at the Combined Commander's Conference, 12 Sandra Destradi: India's Involvement in Nepal (2005 Nepal ( -2008 insurgency to its own states on the border with Nepal and a strengthening of Naxalism. In fact, India itself was (and still is) affected by the activities of Maoist rebels, the so-called Naxalites, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh defining left-wing extremism as "the singlebiggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country" (Muni 2008a: 17) . 22 India's third broad, stated goal is that of economic development, dynamism, and "collective prosperity" in the region as a whole. 23 Starting in 2005 this objective was prominently related to the notion of "connectivity," the idea of (re)establishing communication and transportation links between the countries of the region. 24 The notion of interdependence among South Asian countries is also related to the principle of stability in South Asia:
So, even if there are political changes which may take place in that country, which, of course, you should always be responsive to, the fact is that the stand of interdependence is to provide a certain stability to the relationship despite political changes, because the logic of the interdependence will not permit the political relationship to swing from one side to another. 25 Therefore, the goal of economic development and collective prosperity for the whole South
Asian region needs to be considered in the context of India's primary goal of stability. Moreover, as one of the experts interviewed put it, "development is more a national goal than a goal for the region." 26 All this could cause us to assume that India's official discourses about connectivity and collective prosperity might be rhetorical moves rather than foreign policy objectives of primary importance. For an account of Naxalite activities in India, see Ramana (2008 In Nepal in particular, China's activities have long constituted a source of concern for India, at least since the Nepalese king Mahendra started "playing the China card" against India in the 1960s (Singh 1988: 152-158; Rose 1971: 238-242 ).
The promotion of democracy does not figure as one of India's stated foreign policy goals; its tabooization has already been mentioned above. More than this, the promotion of democracy seems to hardly be compatible with goals like the limitation of negative security externalities and, especially, the provision of support for stable regimes in neighboring South
Asian countries. As highlighted by Wagner (2009: 5-6) , the goal of stability has often prompted New Delhi to privilege this objective over democracy, leading to highly contradictory policies on India's part. The country's involvement in the peace and democratization process in Nepal, which will be addressed in the following section, is clearly illustrative of this problem. Overall, India's regional policy goals and their limited compatibility with democracy promotion help to explain India's reluctance to export its regime type abroad. These primary sources were coded with the help of the Atlas.ti software according to their more or less threatening and coercive or cooperative and conciliatory "tone" according to the following "code families":
threat, diplomatic pressure, hard persuasion, neutral statement, soft persuasion, promise/commitment, diplomatic praise, and leadership. These data were complemented by the expert interviews mentioned above.
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For an account of the Maoists' goals and ideology and of their "People's War," see Upreti (2008) and Muni (2003) . the fact that India (and other external actors such as the US and the UK) had been advising the king against taking such a move over the previous months (Cherian 2005b there is a problem they come to India, they know people here, have studied together-so they just come and talk to their friends in India." 43 Indian experts prefer not to talk about Indian "mediation" between the Maoists and the SPA since they are always careful not to give the impression that India intervened in the internal affairs of a neighbor country. Most of the interviewees questioned about the concrete way in which India was involved in the dialogue process gave the following assessment of India's role: India offered the Nepalese Maoists and the SPA a neutral discussion platform, a place where they could meet and talk about the future of their country without being disturbed or observed by the Nepalese media. 44 Officially, India was involved only insofar as the secret services allowed the Maoist leaders to cross the border without any problems. 45 This is particularly remarkable since the CPN-M representatives were still being persecuted as terrorists in India (Mishra 2004: 637) , a fact which reflected the importance of New Delhi's goal of avoiding the spillover of terrorist activities.
While the Indian experts interviewed underlined that during the talks India did not exercise lieve that the principles of multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy, enshrined in the country's constitution will be adhered to in order to ensure political stability in the country." "The situation is an evolving one. For the present let me only say that we are concerned over the arrests and detention, once again, of several political leaders, professionals and students which we strongly deplore. These actions by the government in Nepal are counter-productive. There needs to be cooperation among the constitutional forces in Nepal, not confrontation. We urge the immediate release of those arrested and a return to the The ambiguity of India's attitude towards democracy in Nepal became even more evident when Gyanendra's announcement, on April 21, that he was going to transfer executive powers to a government to be formed by the democratic parties was greeted with relief by New
Delhi. Like a large part of the international community, which "rushed to endorse the royal proposal without waiting to hear the response of Nepal's people and their representatives" (ICG 2006: 10) , India welcomed Gyanendraʹs decision since it implied the promise of a return to multiparty democracy. 52 However, the protesters on the streets were unsatisfied with Gyanendraʹs concessions, which they considered insufficient, and the SPA refused to form a government on the king's terms.
It was not only the international community that "lost credibility by attempting to pres- The conciliatory tone of Shyam Saran's speech was clearly an attempt to make amends for India's prolonged support for the king, which stood in opposition to the popular will in Nepal. It has to be taken into account, however, that the Indian government, while supporting the king as long as possible, at the same time reportedly played an important role in preventing a bloodbath. According to some reports, India influenced the Royal Nepal Army's top brass at the height of the April 2006 uprising in order to avoid the violent crushing of the mass movement (Cherian 2006) . This is again a sign of India's enormous influence on events in Nepal and of the-at times-constructive informal role New Delhi played in Nepalese politics.
Formal Support for Democracy
The end of Jan Andolan II was followed by a bustling period marked by historic changes. On Sandra Destradi: India's Involvement in Nepal (2005 the government of Nepal. 64 Therefore, we can observe a shift in India's Nepal policy after in New Delhi's democracy-promotion policy in the sense of an increased readiness to get involved in activities intended to export its own regime type abroad? Or should India's foreign policy regarding Nepal be interpreted rather as being largely consistent with its traditional rejection of democracy promotion and, therefore, as a series of ad hoc measures primarily intended to achieve other goals: stability, the avoidance of spillover effects to India, the limitation of the influence of external powers over Nepal, and, accordingly, the maintenance of India's own influence?
The analysis provided in this paper suggests that the second hypothesis is the most plausible answer. In fact, even though India put pressure on King Gyanendra during the first phase by officially protesting against his coup and the suppression of fundamental liberties, its use of a combination of hard and soft persuasion in the following months revealed New Delhi's willingness to support the king as long as possible according to the twin-pillar theory.
This was related to the Indian decision makers' need for the monarchy as a "fall-back institution for the stability and integrity of Nepal" (Muni 2008b: 186) : the king was considered to be the actor most able to effectively cope with the destabilizing Maoist insurgency, which India feared could spread to its own border states. Accordingly, India's long-standing support for King Gyanendra and its readiness to coordinate its Nepal policy with the US (Cartwright 2009: 410) were determined to a large extent by the desire to weaken the Maoists militarily and to maintain a certain stability in the country. Only on one occasion did New Delhi resort to a tool that went beyond mere verbal pressure and corresponded to a typical case of negative conditionality: the suspension of arms supplies to Gyanendra in 2005. However, this effort was short-lived and, correspondingly, impinged on the credibility of India's prodemocracy efforts. Besides its desire to stabilize the country and to avoid negative spillover effects across the open border, India's main reason for compromising on the principle of support for democracy in Nepal seems to have been, as outlined above, the need to avoid a further increase in external (especially Chinese) influence in Nepal.
India's far-reaching involvement in the peace and democratization process through the informal facilitation of talks between the CPN-M and the SPA should be considered a forward-looking attempt to stabilize Nepal based on the recognition that the Maoists needed to Delhi's policy. In fact, this shift took place when the security situation in Nepal was getting out of control, and after Karan Singh's visit had further contributed to stirring up popular sentiment. It became clear that the twin-pillar approach was not sustainable anymore, and the Indian government suddenly realized that it had to let the king fall in order to avoid Nepal's descent into complete anarchy.
Instead of viewing the case of Nepal as an indicator of a long-term change in India's strategic approach to democracy promotion, we should see it as a reactive short-term change in policy that was essentially motivated by India's desire to avoid the further destabilization of its neighbor. In this light, even India's facilitation efforts can be considered to have been a far-sighted stabilization measure which was based on the recognition that the involvement of the CPN-M in Nepal's political life had become unavoidable rather than on a transition to democracy promotion for its own sake. The "quiet" character of India's pro-democracy activities and the emphasis on Nepal's autonomy in deciding about its future, as exemplarily expressed in Shyam Saran's statement, reflect India's continued adherence to the principles of noninterference and sovereignty.
Therefore, going back to the question of India's potential transformation into a new democracy promoter, the Nepalese case, when analyzed in detail, reveals that New Delhi's engagement was rather occasional and contingent, and that it originated from the precariousness of Nepal's internal situation. Seen together with India's negative attitude towards democracy promotion as a policy and the primacy of its other foreign policy goals, this leads us to conclude that India has not become a major new actor in democracy promotion. New Delhi's approach to democracy promotion in the future is also likely to remain characterized by a high degree of restraint and by the primacy of pragmatism in dealing with undemocratic regimes.
